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How to Treat the WTO's Problem
with Precedent
Timothy Meyer*
ABSTRACT

This Article argues that the World Trade Organization'sAppellate
Body (AB), or a successor body, must become more transparent in
justifying its decision to rely (or not) on prior decisions. The AB's

practice of precedent-which the United States cited as a cause of its
decision to paralyze the AB by blocking new appointments-is similar
to how it has approached "likeness" in nondiscrimination cases. It
placed a lot of weight on whether two cases (orproducts) are sufficiently
similar to be compared, and it spent relatively less time substantively

justifying its treatment of prior cases. Because the WTO does not have
a system of stare decisis, the AB and WTO panels generally must
explain why they find prior decisions persuasive, rather than simply

relying on similarity to justify carryingprior interpretationsforward.
The Article begins by examining and evaluating the results of a
new study from Jeffrey Kucik and Sergio Puig, the first study to use a

large dataset to study the AB's use of precedent. The Article then
advances a framework for how WTO dispute panels should evaluate the
relevance of prior cases in future disputes. The proposed approach
would treat the comparison of cases as merely a threshold inquiry. If

two cases are sufficiently alike and one party contests the applicability
of the prior decision, then a tribunal must substantively justify its
treatment of the prior decision in light of a variety of factors. In some
instances, the result may be that the AB or a panel acknowledges that a
prior interpretation was wrong and should not be followed. Openly

analyzing the persuasive value of priorcases, and acknowledging when
those cases should not be followed, would better promote the goals of
relying on prior decisions-promotingpredictability,transparency,and

coherence in the law's application-ascompared to deference to prior
decisions based only on the similarityof two disputes.

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. The author thanks Julian
Arato, Harlan Cohen, Rob Howse, Jeff Kucik, Nicolas Lamp, Simon Lester, Sergio Puig,
Sonia Rolland, Greg Shaffer, Mark Wu, and the participants at the UC Irvine Workshop
on Recalibrating U.S. Trade Relations for helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In retrospect, it should hardly be a surprise that the use of
"precedent" became such a problem for the World Trade Organization's
Appellate Body (WTO AB). As any trade lawyer, commentator, or
student knows, the question of "likeness" has bewitched trade law for
years. One might think that "likeness" should serve merely as a check
to make sure that two products compete with each other before doing
the hard work of evaluating whether imports have been treated "less
favorably" on account of their national origin. Instead, likeness is, in
the view of many people, "the core element" of nondiscrimination
jurisprudence under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).1 "The obsession with 'likeness' in the GATT/WTO is unheard
of in any other legal arena." 2
And what is the practice of precedent, if not the practice of treating
like cases alike? 3 Precedential reasoning requires an account of when
two cases are sufficiently similar that they should be subject to the
same rule or, on the other hand, why and how they are different and
thus can permissibly be treated differently. This comparison also
requires a general justification for why like cases should be treated
alike. That justification is intuitive to most lawyers. Precedent serves
values of predictability, transparency, and coherence. In so doing, it
might also promote the legitimacy of the tribunal in the eyes of
stakeholders, thereby boosting the tribunal's effectiveness at resolving
disputes and compliance with its rulings.

1.

Joost Pauwelyn, The UnbearableLightness of Likeness, in GATS AND THE

REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERvICES 358, 359 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole

Pohl, & Pierre Sauve eds., 2008).
2.
Id. at 360.
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961) (discussing the principle of
3.
treating like cases alike).
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But most tribunals also justify the use of prior decisions in
individual cases. At the case-specific level, the practice of justifying
reliance on prior decisions-in other words, the practice of precedenttends to rely on a different set of factors: the correctness of the prior
decision, its administrability, reliance by the governed on the rule from

the prior decision, and changes to relevant law or facts. Legal systems
may often face a tension between the goals of relying on precedent
generally and the goals served by relying on precedent in specificoften difficult-cases. And this tension may be particularly acute in
legal systems, like the WTO and international law generally, where no
express authorization for following precedent exists.

In Extending Trade Law Precedent, Jeffrey Kucik and Sergio Puig
conduct a large-scale empirical study that suggests that the WTO AB
fell victim to this exact tension-adhering to its own prior decisions in

the name of the systemic values of precedent while failing to justify
reliance on precedent in difficult cases. 4 Kucik and Puig's article does
an admirable job of unpacking how the WTO AB used precedent,
despite the formal absence of authorization to do so. 5 While others have
discussed how precedent contributed to the AB's decline, 6 Kucik and
Puig document with data both the AB's construction of a system of

precedent and how that precedential system has operated. They have,
in other words, given us a map of how the AB analyzed whether cases
were "like" and whether "like" cases should be subject to the same rule.
Their main empirical .finding is that the AB relied on precedent
overwhelmingly to follow or extend the reach of its prior decisions, as
7
a means of "strengthening [of] legal commitments." Because the
WTO's negotiation mechanism ceased functioning, political oversight

of the AB became difficult and the extension of precedent ultimately
alienated the United States. Kucik and Puig thus endorse the greater

use of mechanisms, such as sunset clauses, that promote political
accountability for international tribunals. They also argue that in the

international system, extending precedent can ultimately reduce
compliance with the tribunal's decisions, at a cost to the system as a
whole. 8

4.

As of the time of writing, the AB still technically exists but has lacked a

quorum to conduct business for over a year, and hence is moribund. For that reason, I

often refer to the AB in the past tense. When speaking of the future, especially in Part
III, I use the term "AB" to refer either to a revitalized AB or a new body that might take
the AB's place.
5.
Jeffrey Kucik & Sergio Puig, Extending Trade Law Precedent, 54 VAND. J.
TRANsNAT'L L. 539 (2021).
See generally James Bacchus and Simon Lester, The Rule of Precedent and
6.
the Role of the Appellate Body, 54 J. WORLD TRADE 183 (2020); Mariana Clara de
Andrade, Precedent in the WTO: Retrospective Reflections for a Prospective Dispute
Settlement Mechanism, 11 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 262 (2020).
Kucik & Puig, supra note 5, at 543.
7.
Id.
8.
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This Article offers a complementary way to think about the AB's
problems with precedent. It argues that the AB's difficulties were
similar to the problems with its treatment of "likeness" in
nondiscrimination. In short, the AB focused too much on whether two
cases (or products in the nondiscrimination context) were "like," while

minimizing substantive justifications for treating two cases or products
in the same fashion. If two cases were "like," all that remained was to
check to make sure no "cogent reasons" counseled departing from the
previously established rule. 9 But the "likeness" of two cases, similarly
to the "likeness" of two products or services, is best treated as the
prelude to evaluating the substantive reasons for treating the specific
like things alike-be they cases, products, or services. The failure to
inquire into substantive reasons is similar in both the context of
precedent and the context of goods and services and creates similar
problems.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes and
evaluates Kucik and Puig's descriptive results and their conclusions
about the implications of the AB's use of precedent. To preview, their
article often equates the use and extension of precedent with decisions
that narrow the freedom member states have under the WTO
agreements. But tribunals can follow and even extend their prior
decisions without necessarily constricting a state's scope of permitted
action. Precedent, after all, can narrow the scope of legal commitments
just as it can broaden this scope.

Part III argues that international tribunals evaluating whether to
treat two cases alike should engage in a full-throated, two-part
analysis. The first step asks the threshold question of whether earlier
decisions are sufficiently similar to the current case that they might
have persuasive value. If the answer to that first question is yes, the
second step requires tribunals to grapple with the justification for
relying on the reasoning in prior cases. This Article suggests that
inquiry should be grounded in the tribunal's key task-treaty
interpretation-and should therefore focus explicitly on whether states
collectively have embraced prior decisions and the limits of their
endorsement.
II.

THE APPELLATE BODY AND PRECEDENT

In the 2000s

and early 2010s,

the United

States became

disenchanted with the WTO AB-the centerpiece in the WTO's "crown
jewel" of a dispute settlement system.10 While originally conceived of

9.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶ 51, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted May 20, 2008).
10.
See, e.g., Jennifer Hillman, A Reset of the World Trade Organization's
Appellate
Body,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELS.
(Jan.
14,
2020),
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as a standing body to correct legal errors in panel decisions in WTO

disputes, the AB quickly became the chief component of the most
functional element of the WTO. In part, that stemmed from divisions
among an expanding membership that limited the possibility for
successful negotiations. In part, it also stemmed from a difference in
rules. WTO members automatically adopt AB and unappealed panel
rulings unless they agree by consensus not to, while negotiated

outcomes require affirmative consensus to conclude the negotiations.
In other words, holdouts can block negotiations, but not decisions from

panels and the AB interpreting the WTO agreements.
The United States had multiple grievances, but, at bottom, most
of the grievances stemmed from a belief that the AB was not reading
the WTO agreements as they were written. With respect to substantive
commitments, the United States believed that AB decisions imposed
new trade liberalization commitments to which the members had not

agreed, especially with regard to disciplines on trade remedies. But the
United States also believed that the AB was ignoring textual limits on
its own authority, such as time limits on AB proceedings. Straddling

these issues, the United States attacked the AB's decision to follow its
own previous decisions, a practice of precedent. The Dispute
Settlement Understanding

(DSU) does not explicitly authorize a

system of precedent in any form and certainly does not countenance a
firm rule of stare decisis. Evidence that professional staff at the WTO
Secretariat exert disproportionate influence over WTO dispute reports
further fueled US concerns. 11 The United States worried about a
transfer

of decision-making

from

appointed

(and thus

at least

somewhat accountable) panels and AB members to unaccountable and
entrenched bureaucrats who might be wedded too strongly to prior
decisions on which they had worked. 12 While the objection to the use of
precedent goes to the AB's mode of deciding cases, the US objection to
the use of precedent focused, of course, on the use of precedent in
substantive decisions with which the United States disagreed, which
are primarily in the trade remedies area.

Because the United States ultimately paralyzed the AB by
blocking the reappointment of members, addressing the United States'

concerns is essential to reanimating the AB or constructing a successor
organization. To that end, Kucik and Puig have conducted what is to
my knowledge the first comprehensive study of how the AB uses its
prior decisions to decide disputes. Their study provides a critical

https://www.cfr.org/report/reset-world-trade-organizations-appellate-body
[https://perma.cc/R72D-7VYL] (archived on February 21, 2021).
11.
See Joost Pauwelyn & Krzystof J. Pelc, Who Writes the Rulings of the World
Trade Organization?A CriticalAssessment of the Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute
Settlement,
SOC.
SCI.
RsCH
NETWORK,
Oct.
6,
2019,
at
2,
on
(archived
[https://perma.cc/HR4Z-6HTR
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458872
February 21, 2021).
12. Hillman, supra note 10.
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starting point for any conversation about how to reform the AB. This

Part describes Kucik and Puig's study and discusses some limitations
as to what one can infer from their results.
A. How the AB Used Precedent
Kucik and Puig begin by coding the AB's use of its prior decisions.
Their framework for coding AB precedent begins by asking, with
respect to each citation the AB makes to its own prior cases, whether
the AB applied its own prior decision or failed to apply its own prior

decision.1 3 Each of those two categories can then be broken down into
two further categories. Applications of past precedent can either
"follow" or "extend" past precedent.' 4 Failures to apply past precedent
can either "distinguish" prior decisions or "narrow" them. 5
The distinctions between "following" and "extending" precedent,
on the one hand, and "distinguishing" and "narrowing" precedent, on
the other hand, is more than semantic. Extensions, in their view,
"reflect a stronger application of precedent because extensions
arguably use inapposite case law to resolve open questions."1 6 Some of
the examples Kucik and Puig give are intuitive. They involve, for
instance, applying decisions about one provision of law to another
similarly worded provision, such as using GATT provisions to interpret

similar General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provisions.l7
Kucik and Puig also consider applications of precedent involving one
provision of an agreement to another provision of the same agreement
to be an extension. This is clearest in the antidumping cases, in which
the AB applied its early decisions finding zeroing impermissible under
Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to later cases challenging
zeroing under other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that
did not contain the language-"all comparable export transactions"on which the early case had turned.18
With respect to failure to apply precedent, Kucik and Puig make
a distinction between "distinguishing" a prior decision and "narrowing"
it. The former refers to "explain[ing] specifically why the rationale of a
prior case does not apply to the case at hand."' 9 The latter refers to
decisions that "shrink the scope of the [best prior] reading to have a

Kucik & Puig, supranote 5, at 558-59.
13.
14.
Id. at 558.
Id.
15.
Id. at 562 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
16.
17.
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States - MeasuresAffecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 159, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 20, 2005); Appellate Body Report, Argentina- Measures Relating to Trade
in Goods and Services, ¶¶ 6.24, 6.25 WTO Doc. WT/DS453/AB/R (adopted May 9, 2016).
Kucik & Puig, supra note 5, at 571 (discussing United States-Zeroing's
18.
extension of the AB's decision in EU-Bed Linen).
19. Id. at 561.

2027]
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more limited bearing on the decision at hand." 20 The AB availed itself
of these two options with less frequency than their opposites. Overall,

Kucik and Puig find that the AB followed its precedents 77 percent of
the time, extended its precedents 10 percent of the time, narrowed its

precedents 7 percent of the time, and distinguished its precedents 6
percent of the time. 21
It is a bit difficult to know what to make of these numbers. On the
one hand, the fact that the AB overwhelmingly cited its prior decisions

in order to follow them seems on the surface to support the US
complaint that the AB has adopted an unauthorized system of
precedent. On the other hand, though, not even the United States
argues that prior decisions are irrelevant. Rather, the United States
22
argues that prior decisions are useful for their persuasive value.
Since many applications of previous decisions involve uncontroversial

topics, it therefore makes sense that "following" precedent is the most
significant category. At the same time, it may not tell us much about
the use of precedent in cases that are difficult or controversial.
In fact, the dramatic discrepancy between applying precedent and
failing to do so might stem from the AB's decisions not to use
precedential reasoning in many instances. As Kucik and Puig
acknowledge, this discrepancy could be in part because the AB did not

mention precedents found inapplicable. Kucik and Puig are, after all,
only examining the use of citations by the AB; they cannot observe the
decision not to cite. The AB might, in other words, have tried to bolster
its legitimacy by citing cases it intends to follow or extend, thus

creating the appearance of a coherent and predictable body of law. At
the same, though, the AB yielded to pressures to be less coherent by
simply omitting citations to disregarded cases. If true, the AB fell into
a trap of its own making. By not being transparent about its decisions

not to follow precedent, the AB may have created the appearance of
following precedent more than it does-thereby opening itself to the

US complaint.
While this is a limitation of their findings (one that is imposed on
them by the nature of citation), it does not meaningfully reduce the
impact of their descriptive results. The AB overwhelmingly uses past
decisions as a justification for adopting a decision in the case before it.

As Part III argues, Kucik and Puig have shown that the AB has an
expansive definition of what constitutes "like" cases.

20. Id. at 546.
21. Id. at 559-61.
22.
Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute
¶ 36 (Dec. 18, 2018) [hereinafter US Statements]
Settlement Body,
https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Dec18.DSB_. Stmt_. asdeliv.fin_.public.pdf [https://perma.cc/48PE-DS2V] (archived on February 21, 2021).
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B. The Implications of the AB's Use of Precedent
Having mapped the AB's use of precedent, Kucik and Puig go on
to consider the implications of that use. They argue that "[i]n recent
years, the United States has complied less frequently with rulings"and
they posit that "the application of precedent is a major contributing
factor." 23 They show that overall compliance with WTO Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") decisions hovers consistently around 60
percent, while US compliance drops from 66 percent before 2009 to 39
percent afterwards.2 4 They argue that "the change in US behavior is
traceable more directly to the aforementioned decision in United
States-Continued Zeroing as well as United States-Stainless Steel
(Mexico), introducing the 'absent cogent reasons' approach"essentially a presumption in favor of following precedent. 25
Kucik and Puig are properly circumspect about the causal
connection between the AB's use of precedent and the decline in US
compliance. They note, for instance, that "many other things happened
around this time"2 6 and underscore that "precedent is not the only
issue that influences whether states abide by their trade-liberalizing
commitments." 27 Nevertheless, they argue that the AB's use of
precedent "clearly influences the behavior of one of the WTO's most
powerful members." 2 8
I am not so sure. The AB's use of precedent did prompt a backlash
from the United States. The United States complained about the AB's
use of precedent. It cited the use of precedent as a concern with the
AB's approach in support of its decision to block consensus on the
appointment of new AB members.2 9 But the claim that the AB's use of
precedent, as such, led to a decline in US compliance is more specific
and requires more substantiation.
To begin, Kucik and Puig are right that other things were
happening in 2009 that might explain the subsequent change in US
behavior. Most obviously, the financial crisis of 2008-2010 imposed a
substantial burden on the entire global economy. If dispute settlement
decisions do not take account of the political pressure brought to bear

Kucik & Puig, supra note 5, at 574.
23.
24.
Id. at 576-78.
25.
Id. at 577. James Bacchus and Simon Lester argue that the "absent cogent
reasons" standard and the United States' preferred "persuasive" value standard are
likely to produce similar results in practice. Bacchus & Lester, supra note 6, at 193-94.
That may be true in practice, but a reasonable lawyer (or member of a subsequent
dispute panel) might reasonably conclude that the "absent cogent reasons" standard
places the burden on the party attempting to avoid the application of precedent.
Kucik & Puig, supranote 5, at 577.
26.
27.
Id. at 579.
28.
Id.
See US Statements, supra note 22.
29.

2o21]
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on governments due to an economic crisis, it can hardly be a surprise
that compliance with those decisions falls after the crisis.o
To be sure, Kucik and Puig do not find a change in overall

compliance with DSB decisions, though the Great Recession had global
effects.31 This fact does suggest something unique to the United
States. 32 But, two other trends might well have played a unique role in
the United States. The first is the entrenchment of textualism and its
33
constitutional cousin, originalism, in US legal practice. Common law
jurisdictions have always been more wary of using extrinsic evidence
to vary or supplement the meaning of legal texts than have civil law
jurisdictions and international tribunals. However, in the United
States, statutory textualism and constitutional originalism have
spread that reluctance to public law as well. Indeed, textualism's
exclusion or minimization of non-textual sources sits in some tension
with rules of treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties. 3 4
Nor would it be a surprise that textualism/originalism would take

a while to percolate into US trade law. Justice Antonin Scalia, the US
Supreme Court Justice that deserves the most credit for spreading the
approach, didn't even join the Supreme Court until 1986. Over the

ensuing decades, the approach became more prevalent in US courts
and increasingly taught in law schools. Perhaps by coincidence, in her
2010 Supreme Court confirmation, US Supreme Court Justice Elena
Kagan declared that "we are all originalists" now.35 Her 2015 Scalia
Lecture at Harvard Law School made the same argument about
textualism more broadly.3 6 The decline in US compliance thus also

This claim does not require that overall protectionism increase as a result of
30.
the financial crisis. Rather, it only requires that governments, or in this case the US
government, became less willing to accommodate claims of WTO inconsistency for those
measures that they did adopt to protect their domestic economies.
Kucik & Puig, supra note 5, at 576-78. One might also wonder whether Kucik
31.
and Puig should look at whether AB practices with to precedent have changed over time.
If the AB's use of precedent accelerated in the years before the U.S. decline in
compliance, that would offer further evidence in support of their claim. If it has remained
fairly constant, though, that might suggest other factors were more important.
32.
Kucik and Puig do not have a theory about what makes the U.S. complaint
about precedent at the WTO unique, simply taken the strength of the U.S. complaint
about precedent at face value. One possibility stems from the renewed U.S. interest in
fidelity to text in statutory and constitutional interpretation.
33. Textualism is a theory of interpretation under which the ordinary meaning of
a legal text is given primacy, and non-textual sources such as the intention of the law's
drafters are discounted. See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).

34.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
35. Kagan: 'We Are All Originalists,'LEGALTIMES: BLT (June 29, 2010, 9:22 AM),
https://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/kagan-we-are-all-originalists.html
[https://perma.cc/V42F-WKMC] (archived on February 21, 2021).
36. Justice Elena Kagan, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena
Kagan on the Reading of Statutes (Nov. 15, 2015).
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coincides with the emergence of the hegemony of text in US law. US
trade lawyers educated in a textualist legal tradition are more likely
to be hostile to applying precedent involving one treaty provision to a
different provision that uses different words. 37
US-style textualism happened to coincide with another important
trend: an increased focus on communities within the United States
that have been harmed by trade liberalization. David Autor, David
Dorn, and Gordon Hanson have documented how local labor markets
in regions of the United States with import-competing manufacturing
industries had not recovered years after China's accession to the
WTO. 3 8 The pressure from Chinese imports, combined with the Great
Recession, led to increasing skepticism about trade liberalization, and
associated calls for more protection, among influential constituencies
within the United States. This political pressure ultimately forced
President Obama to abandon his attempts to ratify the Trans-Pacific
Partnership before he left office and drove President Trump's trade
policies. While the EU did face some of the same pressures, most
European nations have social safety nets that are considerably wider
and more generous than US social safety nets. By absorbing the brunt
of the economic dislocation that can result from trade liberalization,
social welfare programs tend to bleed off the pressure for protection. 39
In so doing, social welfare programs support trade liberalization.
The small government ethos that has characterized US politics
since the 1980s has, so far, taken a dramatic expansion of the social
safety net off the table. That leaves protection as the primary
politically feasible vehicle to address the dislocations caused by trade
liberalization in the United States. Protection redistributes economic
gains from consumers to producers and their employees, just as direct
fiscal programs redistribute from taxpayers to import-competing
businesses and workers; but, it does so in a less transparent and less
efficient fashion than redistribution through direct government
spending. While voters understand direct fiscal programs as

Harlan Cohen has argued that precedent in international tribunals emerges
37.
in part through the practice and norms of the legal community. See generally Harlan
Grant Cohen, Lawyers and Precedent, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1025 (2014). But when
interpretive norms became fractured among the community of lawyers, norms about
following precedent will also come under strain. See also ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL?

6-8

(2017) (demonstrating how the diverse

influences on international lawyers cause them to approach international law
differently).
38.
David H. Autor, David Dorn, & David H. Hanson, The ChinaSyndrome: Local
Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. EcON. REV.
2121, 2155-59 (2013).
See, e.g., Sung Eun Kim & Krzysztof Pelc, The Politics of Trade Adjustment
39.
at 5-6,
24, 2020,
Sept.
POL. STUD.
Trade Protection, COMPAR.
vs.
[https://perma.cc/NT37https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414020957687
XSRD] (archived on February 21, 2021); Timothy Meyer, Saving the PoliticalConsensus
in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985, 1016-17 (2017).
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redistribution (a term that has a negative connotation in significant
quarters of the United States), they do not understand protection in
the same way. Unlike taxes that fund direct redistribution, the costs of

protection are diffuse and hard to see for the average consumer. To the
extent they do understand that protection imposes costs, politicians in

the United States have encouraged voters to see those costs as imposed
on foreign producers, rather than American consumers. 40
Not surprisingly, given these pressures, Congress enacted
changes to US trade remedies law during the Obama administration
that made the imposition of trade remedies easier.4 1 In other words,
just as the AB was extending its precedents to cabin member state
discretion to impose trade remedies, the United States was legislating
changes in the opposite direction within its own domestic law. Given

these opposing trends, it should not come as a shock that US
compliance with WTO DSB decisions declined.
This raises another important question about Kucik and Puig's
claims that the extension of precedent contributed to the decline in US

compliance: Was the United States responding to the application of
precedent as such, or was the United States objecting to the content of
specific decisions regarding trade remedies? The distinction matters

for Kucik and Puig's larger thesis about the role of precedent. The
claim that the United States disliked the content of the decisions in
cases like United States-Continued Zeroing and United StatesStainlessSteel (Mexico) seems uncontroversial.4 2 But it is not clear that

the United States would have objected (at least as strenuously) if the
extension of precedent had worked to its advantage, rather than its

disadvantage. 43 To put the counterfactual in concrete terms, if, for
instance, European Communities-Bed Linen had upheld zeroing
under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, would the United

States have objected to the extension of that precedent to challenges to
zeroing under other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement? 4 4 I

40.
President Trump, for instance, insisted that tariffs on Chinese imports would
be paid by China. See, e.g., Brooks Jackson, Does China Pay Tariffs?, FAcTCHECK.ORG
2019),
https://www.factcheck.org/2019/02/does-china-pay-tariffs/
(Feb.
28,
[https://perma.cc/5QQC-QACB] (archived on February 21, 2021).
41.
See Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat.
362.
42.
See Kucik & Puig, supra note 5, at 578-79.
43.
The United States has had three confirmation hearings for Supreme Court
Justices in the past four years. Precedent has played a major role in these hearings, with
Senators on both sides of the aisle demanding that the nominee agree that certain
precedents should not be overruled, but other precedents are obviously wrong and
therefore should be overruled. These Senators, it seems to me, are not concerned with
precedent as such, but rather with the content of particular decisions.

44.
Zeroing is a controversial technique for calculating whether dumping-the
introduction of products of one country into the commerce of another country at less than
the normal value of the products, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI,
Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187-has occurred. In essence, instead of averaging the
deviation of prices from normal value to decide whether dumping has occurred, an
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don't think so. Nor does the United States appear to object to reliance
on uncontroversial prior decisions.

Put differently, Kucik and Puig often seem to assume that the
application of precedent will result in limiting the freedom states enjoy
under international law.45 This assumption is implicit in their focus on
the relationship between precedent and compliance. But precedent will
usually only raise a question of compliance when precedent is applied
so that the respondent loses. Where precedent is applied against the
complainant, and the respondent therefore wins, the question of
compliance never arises. 46 A study that looks at compliance decisions
in response to precedent will thus be very likely to find that precedent
reduces compliance. This result will occur because the study is not
looking at the situations in which precedent is used to increase the
flexibility afforded to states (i.e., situations in which the respondent
wins). 47

Kucik and Puig conclude by examining how states exert control
over an international tribunal in the absence of a functioning political
system. This discussion does not depend on whether the United States'
decline in compliance is caused by precedent as such or not. They are
quite right to note, as others have noted in the international law
context more generally, 48 that noncompliance is a key tool states have
to control the reach of tribunal decisions. Reappointment, the tool that
the United States has used most aggressively in response to its
complaints about the AB, and strategic litigation are also effective
tools.4 9 The most intriguing idea that Kucik and Puig embrace, though,
is the use of sunset clauses. The United States has deployed this idea

investigating authority "zeroes" all prices that do not show dumping, thus cause the
dumping margin to increase.
See, e.g., Kucik & Puig, supra note 5, at 554 ("Precedent can make the rules
45.
sufficiently stringent that the domestic 'constituencies of compliance' cannot mobilize
effectively.").
46.
Since many WTO decisions find for both parties on at least some issues,
rather than delivering a clear victory for either the complainant or respondent, it might
be more accurate to say that compliance costs are low when the respondent is, as a
practical matter, the winner.
47.
Scholars have worried more generally that compliance, which measures state
behavior against a legal standard, is not the best way to assess international law's
impact. See, e.g., Lisa L. Martin, Against Compliance, in INTERDIScIPLINARY
PERsPEcTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 591, 591 (Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Mark A Pollack eds., 2012). Effectiveness, which measures changes in state
behavior against the status quo, might yield a more accurate picture of how international
law impacts state decision-making.
48.
E.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the InternationalRule of Law,
31 YALE J. INT'L L. 189, 189-92 (2006); Timothy Meyer, Noncompliance as Lawmaking,
in LEGITIMACY AND LAW-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Heike Kreiger
ed., forthcoming 2021).
Kucik & Puig, supra note 5, at 574.
49.
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in the revised NAFTA (the so-called United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement, or USMCA). Sunset clauses in trade agreements can be an
effective way to encourage trade liberalization's proponents to remain
engaged in negotiating measures to address the dislocations that trade
agreements can cause.5 0 The AB's decisions limiting member state

flexibility in the trade remedy area raise the same issue regarding the
appropriate balance between trade liberalization and support for
import-competing industries and labor. An appropriately designed
sunset clause, one with safeguards similar to the ones in the USMCA,
seems a reasonable solution to encourage ongoing negotiations on a
range of issues that might arise under an agreement, including the
scope of an international tribunal's mandate and the content of its

decisions. If nothing else, a sunset clause would make transparent the
ability of objectors to shut down or withdraw from an agreement and/or
its dispute settlement system at particular times. That transparency
would be an improvement over using the appointment of dispute body
members to create leverage for negotiations.
III. JUSTIFYING ADHERENCE TO DECISIONS IN SIMILAR CASES
Kucik and Puig's study tees up the question of how the AB, or a
reconstituted body, can rely on its prior decisions in a way that creates

the predictability to which legal systems aspire while respecting the
limits states have imposed on AB decision making. This Part offers a
tentative two-step framework that seeks to accommodate both of these
concerns. In short, this Article suggests that the AB first determine

whether a prior decision is sufficiently similar to the current dispute
to be persuasive. That inquiry, however, should merely be a threshold
inquiry. If two cases are sufficiently similar, the AB should then

evaluate the substantive reasons for relying on its prior decisions. This
justification need not apply to every citation in a report. Instead, the
degree of justification (as opposed to the factors justifying reliance,
discussed below) required at the second stage would depend on the
extent to which the parties contest the correctness of prior decisions,

the importance of the issue to resolving the dispute, and the degree of
similarity between the current case and a prior case found sufficiently
like to have persuasive value.
This Article does not claim that this approach will produce

dramatically different results across the range of appellate cases.
Rather, in the difficult cases in which following prior decisions, or
failing to do so, is controversial, the framework will force the AB to
justify its decision more fulsomely than it has in the past. That
justification, in turn, will boost the AB's legitimacy. It will also make

it easier for the AB to justify a decision not to follow a prior decision.

50.

Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, 73 VAND. L. REv. 151, 210 (2020).
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In so doing, it will reintroduce the flexibility into dispute settlement

that members contemplated when they declined to impose a firm rule
of stare decisis while preserving the benefits of predictability and
increasing transparency about how and when prior decisions will be
followed. Most importantly, reflexive adherence to prior decisions
elevates the role of the AB at the expense of member state arguments
in individual disputes. Forcing the AB to evaluate and justify its
decision to rely on prior reports will force the AB to engage thoughtfully
with member state arguments as to why prior decisions were wrong,
thereby giving member states a greater ongoing role in the
interpretation of the WTO agreements.
A. How to Evaluate PriorDecisions in Contemporary Disputes
Systems of precedent can operate in two ways. First, precedent

can operate vertically, as when a lower tribunal follows a higher
tribunal's prior cases. Second, precedent can operate horizontally, as
when a tribunal follows its own prior decisions (which often will be
decisions of other members of the tribunal, rather than the same
members) or the decisions of another similarly situated tribunal. Both
types of precedent are potentially in play at the WTO, although Kucik
and Puig are primarily concerned with the second, horizontal type.
With vertical precedent, tribunals are bound to follow the
decisions of courts that outrank them. A trial court must follow the
prior decisions of an appellate court, and all lower courts must obey a
court of last resort, a supreme court. In legal systems with a doctrine
of stare decisis, this form of precedent is typically the strongest. Lower
tribunals ask only the first question in our two-step precedential
inquiry: Is the present case "like" a prior case decided by a higher
tribunal?5 1 If so, the lower tribunal must follow the higher tribunal's
decision. While a formal rule of stare decisis makes this adherence
mandatory, lower tribunals also have an institutional interest in
following the decisions of higher tribunals. Because the higher tribunal
can overrule the lower one, the lower one may wish to stay within the
boundaries established by their "bosses."
The Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), of course,
establishes two levels of dispute settlement, panels and the AB. At the
same time, the DSU does not establish a rule of stare decisis for panels
with regard to prior AB decisions. This makes sense because, in an
important way, panel and AB reports are equivalent. Neither has any
force on its own. Each only has force to the extent it is adopted by the

.

51. See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel v. United States, 809 Fed. App'x 982, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2020) ("On appeal, AIIS urges that Algonquin does not control this case ..
Agreeing with the Court of International Trade that Algonquin controls, we affirm
without deciding what ruling on the constitutional challenge would be proper in the
absence of Algonquin.").
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Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")-that is, by the member states
themselves. An unappealed adopted panel report is thus a decision of

the DSB just as an adopted AB report is. This suggests that WTO
dispute settlement should not have a strong norm of vertical precedent.
At the same time, though, in individual cases in which a panel report
is appealed, the AB has the power to reverse panel interpretations of
WTO agreements. The AB has inferred a strong norm of vertical
precedent from this fact.5 2

Horizontal precedent-which applies to the AB's treatment of its
own prior reports and, for the reasons just discussed, arguably applies

to panel considerations of prior reports as well-operates differently.
Most obviously, the institutional incentive to follow prior decisions-

the fear of being overruled-is absent. Second, even in systems of
formal stare decisis, the "like" cases question is not the end of the
inquiry. After deciding that two cases are sufficiently similar, tribunals

can then still evaluate whether following prior "like" cases is justified.
They ask, in essence, whether following prior similar decisions is
justified in the current context.
The US Supreme Court, for instance, has held that following past

precedents "is not an inexorable command." 5 3 Instead, if the Court
determines that one of its precedents is applicable to a case, it still uses

a variety of factors to decide whether to continue to apply the precedent
or to depart from it. Those factors include whether: the rule has proven
to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; the rule is

subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification. 54
International tribunals employ a similar

framework

for

reevaluating their precedents. The Advocate General of the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), for instance, said the following

of the CJEU's attitude toward precedents:
[It] has also recognised the importance of adapting its case-law in order to take
account of changes that have taken place in other areas of the legal system or in
the social context in which the rules apply. It has also accepted that the

52.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 161-62, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted May 20,
2008) ("The Panel's failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports
addressing the same issues undermines the development of a coherent and predictable
body of jurisprudence clarifying Members' rights and obligations under the covered
agreements as contemplated under the DSU. . . . We are deeply concerned about the
Panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying
the interpretation of the same legal issues.").
53.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
Id. at 854-55.
54.
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appearance of new factors may justify adaptation or even review of its case55
law.

The CJEU has a history of modifying its precedents, including
explicitly deciding that reconsideration of its prior decisions is
necessary.56 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
indicated that it will depart from its precedents in order to "reflect]
societal changes and remain[] in line with present-day conditions." 57
The ECHR has on that basis departed from its prior decisions in a
number of cases. 58 Similarly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has revised its prior decisions when circumstances have warranted,
such as in its decisions regarding the demarcation of maritime
boundaries.59
The AB has, of course, embraced some flexibility in the application
of its decisions to future cases. It has said it will depart from its prior
decisions in the presence of "cogent reasons." 60 Those cogent reasons
might well include similar kinds of factors to those identified by the US
Supreme Court and various international courts. Nor can the AB be
accused of failing to update its case law. Although the departures may
not necessarily show up in citation studies like Kucik and Puig's (which
is a limitation of the methodology, not of their study specifically), the
AB has revisited its case law in some areas over the years.
This has been particularly true with respect to Article XX of the
GATT, where the AB's jurisprudence has slowly become more
accommodating of member states' public policies that burden trade.
The famous Shrimp-Turtle decision is the best example. There, the
AB essentially abandoned the approach a GATT panel had adopted in
the original Tuna-Dolphin dispute and ultimately upheld the United
States' right to insist that imports meet standards comparable in
61
effectiveness to the standards applicable to domestic products.
Criticism that the AB was always slavishly adherent to precedent is

&

55.
Joined cases C-94 & 202/04, Cipolla v. Rosaria Fazari (nee Portolese), 2006
E.C.R. I-11421, ¶ 29 (Dec. 5, 2006).
56.
See generally Tamas Szabados, 'Precedents'in EU Law-The Problem of
Overruling, 2015 ELTE L.J. 125 (2015).
57.
Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 184 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
Rep. (ser. A) at 11 (1990); see also Stafford v. United Kingdom, App. No. 46295, 35 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 32, 39 (2002) ("A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive
approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement.").
Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and
58.
Arbitrators,2 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5, 13 (2011).
Id. at 11.
59.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
60.
Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶ 160, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted May 20, 2008).
Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp
61.
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 119, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998);
Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products- Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, 1 144, WT[DS58/AB/RW
(adopted Nov. 21, 2001).
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thus misplaced.62 Another example involves the AB's decision in

Dominican Republic-Cigarettes.There, the AB appeared to say that
a non-protectionist explanation for a regulation creating a disparate

impact on imports could be sufficient to avoid a finding that the
regulation treated imports "less favorably" and was thus
discriminatory.6 3

Subsequent decisions,

however,

abandoned this

suggestion in favor of a test that equated "less favorable" treatment
with actions to the detriment of the equality of competitive
opportunity. 64
The AB, though, can still be rightly criticized for insufficiently

justifying its decisions both to follow and depart from its precedents.
The goal of precedent-whether traveling under the banner of stare
decisis, jurisprudence constante, or simply state expectations-is to
ensure predictability, transparency, and coherence. A tribunal that

fails to justify its decisions to follow or depart from precedent does not
achieve these goals. How can member states predict whether a prior
decision will inform a future case regarding a similar issue if the

tribunal has not developed and discussed a comprehensive framework
for making such determinations?

In this sense, adhering to precedent in the name of coherence
elevates form over substance. While it creates coherence among the
decisions of a tribunal, it may destroy the more important coherence
between the objectives of states in entering into a treaty and the
conditions they face in implementing the treaty. It may increase
predictability and transparency with respect to how the tribunal is
likely to rule, but without providing an explanation for changes in
doctrine over time that occur in any legal system. Most importantly, it
may increase the difficulty of departing from prior decisions that

member states feel to be erroneous or untenable. In so doing, it reduces
the legitimate role of member states in
agreements.
That lack of explanation for the changes
undermine the ultimate justification for
legitimacy. The international trade bar

interpreting their own
in doctrine, in turn, can
precedent: sociological
today is much more

In the absence of a functioning AB, a panel also recently applied the "cogent
62.
reasons" test to depart from prior AB decisions on trade remedies. Panel Report, United
States - Anti-Dumping Measures Applying Differential PricingMethodology to Softwood
Lumber from Canada, ¶ 7.107, WTO Doc. WT/DS534/R (circulated Apr. 9, 2019).
63.
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ¶ 96, WTO Doc. WT/DS302/AB/R (adopted
May 19, 2005).
64.
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 179 n. 372, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R
(adopted April 24, 2012); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.101, WTO Doc.
WT/DS400/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014).
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sophisticated than it was in 1995.65 A pattern of decisions from a
tribunal that proudly trumpets consistencies while papering over and
hiding discrepancies is sure to ruffle feathers in any sophisticated legal
community. Those concerns will only be compounded when the
adherence to precedent sits uncomfortably with both the challenges the
legal system as a whole faces and an influential community (US trade
lawyers) with a different interpretive approach, one that suggests that
important precedents that the tribunal adheres to were incorrect in the
first place.
The AB thus needs to become better at transparently justifying

how it uses-or does not use-precedent. In particular, this requires
an explanation when the AB decides not to follow prior decisions. The
AB has historically resisted acknowledging these departures. And one
might worry that openly acknowledging differences in interpretation
over time will itself undermine the AB's legitimacy. But this concern is

overstated for two reasons. First, as already discussed, a lack of
transparency about the reasons for deviating from prior decisions is
itself costly to a tribunal's legitimacy. Second, though, the costs of
openly acknowledging deviation need not be as high as some might
worry. As the next subpart explains, the role of a treaty interpreter
should be a humble one, recognizing the primacy of states as authors
of their own legal obligations. In that context, there should not be
anything wrong with openly admitting that interpretations adopted in

the past are not appropriate to the current dispute. What's needed,
though, is a framework to justify that decision.
B. A Tentative Framework
So what, then, is the appropriate way to take into account prior

decisions at the WTO? As already suggested, WTO dispute panels (in
whatever form they may be constituted in the future) would be wise to
introduce an explicit element that requires consideration of whether
applying a prior decision is justified. Panels should give that element
more importance than the threshold question of whether there are
prior decisions on the same or similar subjects. Its approach would thus
first ask whether a prior decision is sufficiently similar to the current
dispute to have any persuasive value at all. Second, the tribunal would
then explicitly consider a variety of factors to determine whether
according a prior decision any persuasive authority is justified. The
AB, of course, did engage in justification, but its decisions and the
commentary thereon focused heavily on the first prong-"likeness." A
rebalanced approach must devote more time and effort to the second
prong than the AB has historically done.

See, e.g., GREGORY SHAFFER, EMERGING POWERS AND THE WORLD TRADING
65.
SYSTEM: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc LAW (forthcoming May

2021); Cohen, supranote 37, at 1038-40.
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Again, this task need not consume significant resources in every
case. If the parties do not contest the correctness of prior decisions, a
justification for relying on the prior decision may be unnecessary or
limited to briefly noting the parties' agreement. Even if the parties

disagree, the degree of justification may be limited to the importance
of the issue to the dispute, as well as the similarity between the prior
dispute and the current one. The closer the issue and the more central
it is to the current dispute, the greater the need to justify the relianceor the decision not to rely-on prior decisions.
Space does not permit an exhaustive inquiry into the factors that

a WTO dispute panel or the AB (or a future body) should evaluate in
considering the weight to give prior decisions at the second stage of this
inquiry. But, those factors must begin with the appropriate role of

tribunals in treaty interpretation. While the Statute of the ICJ makes
judicial decisions a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law" for that court, the ICJ Statute does not apply to the AB.66 The
DSU says nothing explicit authorizing reliance on prior decisions.6 7
The starting point for justifying the use of a particular prior decision

thus must be the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
Article 31 of the VCLT provides three sources of interpretation:
(1) ordinary meaning of the text; (2) in light of the context and object
and purpose, including instruments made in connection with the
treaty; and (3) any subsequent agreement or practice evidencing an

agreement between the parties with regard to the treaty, or any
relevant rules of international law.

Technically, WTO panel and AB reports both receive legal
significance when they are adopted by the DSB. The relevant legal act
with respect to a report is thus the decision of the DSB adopting the

report. These DSB decisions are plainly not part of the text of the
agreement, nor, since they are not contemporaneous with the adoption
of the WTO Agreement, are they context for its interpretation under
VCLT Article 31.2.
DSB decisions are also not really subsequent agreements under
VCLT Article 31.3. Under the DSU, unappealed panel reports and AB

66.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. WTO member states have also been careful not to label the AB a
"court," raising the question of whether a WTO body could properly consider AB decisions
count as "judicial decisions," even if the ICJ did pursuant to its own statute.
Some scholars have argued that DSU art. 3.2, which provides that
67.
"[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system," permits reliance on prior
decisions. Understanding

on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement

of

Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; see Bacchus & Lester,
supra note 6, at 188. As I have suggested above, though, security and predictability can
be promoted through an explicit framework that guides panels in evaluating whether to
follow prior decisions, rather than simply a presumption in favor of following those
decisions.
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reports are adopted unless a consensus exists against the adoption of
the report. 68 Moreover, "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the
covered agreements." 69 Instead, they "shall be aimed at achieving a
satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and
obligations under this Understanding and under the covered
agreements." 70 Most importantly, DSB decisions have no binding force
apart from the particular dispute at issue. The WTO members can thus
not be said to have agreed to be bound by any legal requirements
through the DSB's adoption of reports. 7 1
The act of adopting reports thus is not relevant to treaty
interpretation as a subsequent agreement. In some circumstances,
though, the adoption of a report might amount to a practice that
constitutes an agreement under VCLT Article 31.3(b). The DSU makes
clear that the adoption of a report is "without prejudice to the right of
72
DSB
Members to express their views" on the report's content.
reports.
and
AB
of
panel
discussions
robust
meetings often involve
Indeed, the United States raised its concerns about the AB's use of
precedent in these very meetings. 73
Meetings in which states do not raise any concerns with a panel
or AB interpretation thus might constitute practice evincing an
agreement among states. A subsequent tribunal might thus reasonably
conclude that a prior decision of the DSB taken without objection is
relevant to treaty interpretation under Article 31.3(b). It is the practice
of member states accepting earlier decisions by the AB that give the
74
AB's decision its weight, not the fact of the AB's decision itself. A
state's later objection during litigation thus might be overcome by its
prior acquiescence to the adoption of an interpretation in a sufficiently
similar case.
Inferring acceptance from the absence of objection in DSB
meetings is consistent with broader international legal norms
regarding the primacy of state consent to treaty interpretation.

DSU, supra note 67, arts. 16.4, 17.14.
68.
Id. art. 3.2.
69.
Id. art. 3.4.
70.
See VCLT, supra note 34, art. 11 ("The consent of a State to be bound by a
71.
treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty,
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.")
DSU, supra note 67, arts. 16.4, 17.14.
72.
See, e.g., US Statements, supra note 22, at ¶ 36.
73.
This approach bears similarities to how the AB described the role of prior
74.
decisions Japan-Alcohol. There, the AB said that previous reports "create legitimate
expectations among WTO members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where
they are relevant to any dispute." Appellate Body Report, Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, at 14, WTO Docs. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted
Nov. 1, 1996). The key question, under my framework, is whether the AB decision created
expectations among states. If it did not, or if those expectations are fractured among
member states, the relevance of the prior decision is diminished or non-existent.
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in treaty
practice
using subsequent
properly,
Understood
interpretation rests on state consent. 75 The AB must be transparent
about where it will look for evidence of subsequent practice evincing
state consent. DSB meetings that precede a straightforward decision

from the AB analyzing the relevance of DSB meetings should therefore
be given less weight. Prior to such an announcement, states were not
on notice of the need to object in order to avoid the possibility of
acquiescing. But after it is clear that DSB meetings are events at which
states can evince an agreement through subsequent practice, then

states are on notice of the need to object if they do not wish to acquiesce.
Where state views on an AB interpretation do not coalesce into
acceptance, the AB should not rely on DSB meetings. In these
situations, there is no basis for inferring a practice that amounts to an
agreement, and thus no basis for inferring state consent. In this sense,
subsequent practice is similar to the formation of rules of customary

international law. States can avoid being bound by a customary rule
by objecting, thus evincing an absence of consent.7 6 So too can objection
in DSB meetings serve to make clear that there is no practice evincing
an agreement among states, and thus that a particular DSB meeting
results in the adoption of a report (which will virtually always be the
case, given the need for consensus to block a report's adoption).

To be sure, this approach-treating the absence of objections as
acquiescence to a panel or the AB's interpretation of an agreementcreates incentives for states to object in DSB meetings. This incentive

is actually a positive, though. It means that where no state objects, a
subsequent panel can be more confident that states do indeed accept
the prior interpretation. And if states do begin objecting more
frequently, little is lost. The panels and the AB cannot rely on DSB
meetings, leaving them no worse off than before. 77 This narrow
approach avoids the problem of expansive interpretations that break
the connection between a tribunal's interpretations and the rule to

which states actually consented-the very problem that got the AB into
trouble with the United States.7 8
When dissensus existed among states at the time a prior
interpretation was made and debated, 79 a tribunal may wish to

75.
Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation:
Informal Change in InternationalOrganizations,38 YALE J. INT'L L. 289, 307 (2013) ("At
bottom subsequent practice is a technique of interpretation based on state consent.").
76.
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Saving CustomaryInternationalLaw, 27 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 115, 142-43 (2005).
77.
Arato, supra note 75, at 294 (noting that the AB traditionally took a "strict"
approach to subsequent state practice).
78.
See id. at 291 (arguing that "judicially driven transformation [often grounded
in state practice] can fray the threads of state consent binding [an] organization to its
constituent member states.").
79.
Even where states do not object to a prior interpretation, a tribunal should be
sure that the proposed application of the prior interpretation is one states could have
foreseen at the time. If states could not have foreseen the prior interpretations
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examine the kinds of factors that other tribunals have looked at in
evaluating whether to follow or depart from past practice. A tribunal
might ask some of the following questions: Have states relied to their
detriment on prior rulings, such as by putting in place policies that
would be difficult to unwind? Has the interpretation proved
unworkable in light of other provisions of the WTO agreements? Has
the surrounding law changed in ways that call into question the
validity of the earlier interpretation? Have relevant facts emerged or
changed in ways that suggest that prior interpretations of the covered
agreements are incorrect? In the context of making an "objective
assessment" of the dispute before it, the answers to these questions
could help a tribunal decide whether prior decisions that have failed to
attract consensual support among member states have persuasive

value.
These kinds of questions will, in many cases, lead to the same
outcomes as the "cogent reasons" test the AB adopted in United States-Stainless Steel (Mexico) or the "persuasiveness" test that the United
States advocated as the correct standard. Indeed, Simon Lester and
former AB member James Bacchus have argued that the practical
daylight between those standards is modest.80 But having an explicit
framework for evaluating precedent that is grounded in the task that
a tribunal undertakes-namely, treaty interpretation-would bolster
the legitimacy of the undertaking. It would also cabin the discretion
tribunals sometimes feel in relying on prior decisions without
explanation. Perhaps most importantly, the act of justifying their
reliance on prior decisions might highlight for a tribunal, during the
course of hearing a dispute and writing a report, those cases in which
reliance on prior decisions cannot be justified.
In this sense, changes to how WTO dispute settlement panels
evaluate the force of prior decisions should mirror needed changes to
the WTO's nondiscrimination case law. That case law follows a similar
two-step approach as the one this Article suggests for precedent,
asking first whether two products are "like" and then asking whether
two like products have been treated meaningfully differently (most
frequently in WTO case law, the relevant test is whether there has
been "less favorable" treatment). Over the years, member states such
as the United States, as well as a range of commentators, have urged
the AB to consider regulatory purpose in applying this test. Although
the "aim and effect" test that the United States urged in the early and
mid-1990s would have assessed the likeness of products in light of the
measure's regulatory purpose, commentators such as Joost Pauwelyn

application in the context of a new case, there would be no reason to object, and nothing
can be inferred from consensus. In my view, the foreseeability of a subsequent
application goes to whether two cases are sufficiently "like" to be comparable, although
tribunals could deal with this concern as the second stage of the inquiry too.
Bacchus & Lester, supra note 6, at 191-92.
80.
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have argued that consideration of regulatory purpose fits more
comfortably within the element that assesses whether like products
have been treated less favorably. 8 1
This approach is, in fact, the approach that the AB adopted in

United States-Clove Cigarettes.There, it held that a panel should only
find "less favorable" treatment under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
if it finds that the challenged measure operates to the detriment of the
equality of competitive opportunities and that such detriment does not
stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. 82 Although
the AB resisted finding this same element in its GATT jurisprudence,
where Article XX was available to justify measures on the basis of a

closed list of regulatory purposes, any reconstituted AB is likely to
come under pressure to consider regulatory purpose as part of its
nondiscrimination jurisprudence more broadly. This pressure stems

both from a need to rebalance the role of sovereignty over domestic
policy and from the fact that Article XX itself is a closed list of
legitimate regulatory objectives.s 3

IV.

CONCLUSION

Strong evidence exists that legal systems with public decisionmaking and reason-giving tend to apply their prior decisions in future

cases. Kucik and Puig have made a significant contribution in
understanding how the WTO AB engaged in this task. They show that
the AB most often just follows its own precedents, although in a small

but significant number of cases the AB extends its precedents to new
situations. Perhaps most surprisingly, they find that the AB rarely
distinguishes or narrows its decisions.
This finding-that the AB primarily uses its prior decisions in

situations in which it decides to follow those decisions-suggests that
the AB is not engaging in a robust exercise of justifying the significance
it gives to its prior decisions. On the surface, such an approach seems
appealing. It creates superficial coherence between AB decisions and,

at least on one view, signals a principled commitment to the rule of
law.

Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 360-62.
81.
82.
Appellate Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 174, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted April 4, 2012).
83.
A common objection to considering regulatory purpose within the GATT's
primary nondiscrimination obligations is that doing so would render GATT art. XX
redundant. This is not true, though, for two reasons. First, a panel might still find
discrimination that can be excused under Article XX, for instance if the detriment to
equality of competitive opportunities stems partially, but not exclusively, from a
legitimate regulatory objective. Second, Article XX is a closed list of legitimate regulatory
objectives, while a consideration of regulatory purpose within Article I or III would allow
consideration of any legitimate regulatory purpose.
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In fact, though, the failure to have a requirement to justify
reliance on prior reports, and a framework to do so, undermines both
the predictability of dispute reports in difficult cases and aggrandizes
dispute settlement panels at the expense of member state
interpretations of their own agreements. With the Biden
Administration taking office in 2021, it seems likely that WTO member

states will renew their efforts to reinvigorate WTO dispute settlement.
When they do so, panels would be well advised to consider changing
how they rely on prior reports to avoid the problems that the WTO AB
encountered in its first decades.

